The paradox has been there from the early years of settlement along the north Atlantic coast.
The Pilgrims and the Puritans soon after them had migrated to the "howling wilderness" of New England out of a determination to build a utopian community that transcended history, a New Zion that was free of the corruption and oppression that they sought to leave behind in Europe. In his metaphor of "a city upon the hill," John Winthrop captured the Puritan's sense of the exceptional nature of their undertaking, which they believed both divinely ordained and without precedent, at least since Biblical times. But while Winthrop underscored the exceptional nature of the Puritan experiment in political, social and religious development, he also stressed its lessons for the rest of humanity; lessons, he believed, would be regarded as "a story and by-word through the world." The city, after all, was on high ground with the "eyes of all people" upon it. 1 Winthrop's metaphor proved to be foundational for the American nation that emerged in the following centuries from a scattering of tiny settler enclaves in New England and along the shores of Chesapeake Bay. Additional images and beliefs--such as the rugged individualism exemplified by the frontiersman, the rags-to-riches ascent of the hardworking entrepreneur, and the nonimperialist nature of American expansion--subsequently reinforced exceptionalist formulations of American national identity on the part of historians and politicians alike. But Winthrop's city on the heights has been among the most enduring and frequently evoked symbols of a national experience that has been seen to be so distinctive that it defies comparison with or incorporation into the history of the rest of humanity. And the discordant internal contradictions of Winthrop's formulation have persisted through centuries of ideological oscillation between exceptionalism and America's variant of a global civilizing mission. Though a number of European, historians have drawn attention to "the basic incompatibility of the exceptionalist claim with political messianism, of singularity with universalism," 2 this fundamental tension in Americans' thinking about themselves and others has largely gone unnoticed, or at least it has rarely been seriously addressed in the now substantial historiographic discourse on American exceptionalism. It is therefore heartening to find in a recent review of Seymour Martin Lipset's Amefican Exceptionalism, Mary
Nolan's succinct summary of the predicament of peoples --in this case the Germans --who have sought to selectively emulate American ways: The [German] goal was to become Americanized while remaining oneself. American exceptionalism, which proclaims the moral and material superiority of the United States, denies the possibility of such emulation and negotiation. The ideology of exceptionalism thus stands in sharp and ironic contrast to much of American foreign and economic policy, from modernization theory to structural adjustment programs, which are premised on America as the only economic and political model. 3 Over the centuries, a variety of sometimes overlapping, but often quite distinct, claims for exceptionalism have been made by American thinkers, social commentators and politicians.
Winthrop's metaphor exemplifies the cosmic teleology version of exceptionalism that has dominated both political rhetoric and popular convictions. In this view, the emergence of the United
States as a global power represents the working out in the mundane realm of a larger, divinelyinspired plan. This sentiment can be found in American readings of their history from the Puritans' conviction that the epidemics that ravaged the Indian population of New England were God's way of preparing the New World for their settlement to Seymour Lipset's recent admission that he believed "hand of providence" responsible for the strong leaders who have emerged in times of crisis in United State's history. 4 Though in some ways a variant of the "Gott mit Uns" impulse that has been a component of the ideological baggage of most societies throughout history, the divinelyordained vision of the American experience has been both more comprehensive and extreme than its counterparts elsewhere. It has also proven a good deal more impervious, at least in popular parlance, than most other national variants of divinely-inspired mission to the unsettling excesses of human folly and cruelty that have abounded in most of human history.
Alternative versions of American exceptionalism are more amenable to empirical testing.
They have also had, particularly in the "American (half) century" of the post-World War II decades, a much greater impact on thinking and writing about United States history as well as approaches to foreign policy in the Cold War era and the first decade of the "new world order. " Though divine imperatives are often implicit, and at times explicit, in these alternative formulations of exceptionalism, they emphasize the uniquely progressive and socially capacious character of What might be construed elsewhere as uninterestingly plebeian was elevated by the national imagination to a new goal for mankind. 7 The persisting conviction that the American experience, despite its unprecedented nature, could serve as a template for the future of less fortunate peoples and less developed cultures not only justified increasing interventionism in the outside world, it often promoted a predisposition to denigrate the worth and viability of foreign, particularly non-Western, cultures. At times, these negative assessments remained implicit, even unconscious. More often, American policy makers, missionaries, and bureaucrats were openly disdainful of cultures and peoples deemed to be beyond the pale of Western (or increasingly American) civilization. Though not necessarily racist but decidedly ethnocentric, their approach to these alien societies was premised on the presupposition that their ways of thinking and doing were diametrically opposed to those of a exceptionally progressive and highly developed United States. From missionary tracts on the plains Indians to the journals of American ambassadors overseas, such epithets as savage and barbaric were standard fare in writings on non-Western peoples from the first years of colonization until well into the twentieth century. Chinese or Japanese leaders who resisted United States inroads into their societies in the late-1800s were caricatured as effete, reactionary or xenophobic; while Muslim revivalists at the end of the twentieth century are indiscriminately lumped together as irrational fanatics bent on fomenting violent opposition to American-inspired efforts to promote economic and cultural globalization. 8 Although often conceived in ignorance, these dismissive representations played a significant role in shaping policies aimed at promoting the Westernization or Americanization of non-Western peoples and societies. This pattern of denigration, or outright dismissal, also led American agents, overseas advisors and colonial administrators to conclude that alien cultures were tabula rasas on which they could inscribe their own values and institutions with impunity. This approach to domination across cultures was manifested in early AngloAmerican policies towards the indigenous Indian peoples of coastal North America, and it persisted in the centuries of settler frontier expansion and Indian dispossession. As recent historians of these processes have concluded, in these circumstances Americanization literally meant "cultural erasure" for the Indians. And there is perhaps no more revealing measure of the low regard that Anglo-Americans had for Indian culture than the fact that, with rare exceptions, even the most sympathetic missionary educators and government agents made no effort to learn the languages of the Indians among whom they worked. 9 From the nineteenth century, the highly ethnocentric and increasingly racist assumptions of the superiority and universal applicability of Euro-American ways that informed American policies towards the Indians were increasingly deployed in encounters with overseas peoples and cultures. In the 1890s and early 1900s, these presuppositions were worked into a distinctive (but by no means unprecedented or unique) American version of the civilizing mission, and some decades later they undergirded the central tenets of modernization theory. Both ideologies were used to justify social engineering projects designed to transform foreign, and again mainly non-Western, societies whose cultures were essentialized as tradition-bound, materially underdeveloped and hopelessly backward. course, considerable merit in Grew's contention that the indifference, suspicion or outright hostility that many, if not most, historians of the United State still evinced towards comparative, much less world history, could in large part be traced to the nature of the American historical profession and the ways in which promotions and plaudits were earned within that community. As Grew observed:
For historians of the United States--who can hardly launch two full careers before beginning to publish, who are already burdened by the need to master an enormous literature and to meet high standards of expertise within the chronologically limited framework of a single nation--it can seem merely prudent to look the other way when the call for comparison is made.
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But, as Grew also recognized, the very kinds of history and ways of approaching historical issues that the profession privileged were perhaps even more important sources of resistance to serious comparative work or even more ambitious studies of broader global patterns. For those who held that key processes in United States history were unprecedented and unique, it followed that they were so significant that they must be studied in and of themselves. From this perspective, it was also not unreasonable to conclude that these processes could not be meaningfully compared to what more comparatively-minded or globally-oriented scholars deemed to be similar developments in other peoples' history. These convictions appeared to most practitioners of American history to be well-founded, given the sheer size of the United States (and the corresponding bulk of its historical production), its relative isolation well into the twentieth century, and, particularly in the postWorld War II decades, its preponderant influence in international affairs. Again Raymond Grew succinctly captures these contextual buttresses of exceptionalism:
Our nation . . . spreads across a huge and essentially monolingual continent where daily experience involves less frequent contact than most nations enjoy with neighbors who speak different tongues, look to very different -traditions, and claim distinctive cultures. Concerned to root their analysis in the full context of the society they study, historians may even in their most formal work be especially subject to the society and culture that shaped them, which can become a constricting circle for those studying their own society. In an extended critique of American exceptionalism, Ian Tyrrell has also deplored the neglect, and often the outright dismissal, of cross-cultural research by historians of the United States. In
Tyrrell's view, the Americans' preoccupation with their own history has not only discouraged serious scholarship with a transnational frame of reference, it has skewed much of the comparative work that has been undertaken in recent decades. His contention that comparative work undertaken by American scholars has usually begun with questions or patterns discerned in United States history that were then tested through an examination of similar phenomena in other areas works well for many of the studies written before the late 1960s. 19 As Tyrrell himself notes, his critique of American historians' approaches to comparative history owes much to Raymond Grew, who several years earlier argued that critical topics in United States history were usually the starting point for forays into cross-cultural analysis, including those focussing on slave systems, frontiers, and race relations. Grew observed that issues arising in the study of the history of other societies had rarely shaped investigations of comparable phenomena in America, and he argued that even scholars who have made significant use of case evidence drawn from elsewhere in the Americas, Africa or Eurasia rarely sustained a serious research commitment to these areas. 20 The fine comparative studies of such scholars as George Fredrickson, Philip Curtin, Jack
Greene, and Ian Steele render the categorical assessments of Tyrrell and Grew dubious at best.
they are even more troubling in view of the unintended and ironic Americancentrism that Tyrrell and Grew themselves exhibit. Neither takes into account the very substantial corpus of comparative historical work produced by American scholars that does not feature United States case examples or American interaction with other societies. 22 On topics ranging from colonialism and peasant protest to international immigration and environmental transformations, this scholarship has in fact contributed substantially to the development of the comparative and global subfields in terms of theory and methodology, in the identification of critical issues for study and debate, and not the least in enhancing our understanding of the history of other peoples and regions, especially those in the "nonWestern" world, who had been long neglected or ignored by American historians. Grew may well be correct in concluding that because of the excessively inward-looking nature of much of American historical scholarship, it has not had an international impact commensurate with the high quality and innovativeness characteristic of much of a prodigious quantity of research and writing. 23 But if the major contributions American scholars have made to both comparative and global history beyond that centered on issues rooted in United States historiography are taken fully into account, in these subfields of research and writing at least their influence proves a good deal more considerable that Grew allows. 24 The need for the full integration of the American experience into comparative and global history has perhaps been the most convincingly demonstrated by the important ways in which crosscultural studies have shaped the research agenda for a diverse range of subfields dealing with processes that have been central to the American experience. In core fields of research ranging from slave systems and racial ideologies to frontier expansion, industrialization and struggles for civil rights, comparative studies have since the 1960s proved critical to the development of United States historiography. They have identified questions that need to be pursued, established issues worthy of serious debate, and plotted broader historical patterns that had earlier tended to be obscured by a surfeit of primary source materials and a privileging of specialized research. 25 All of these tasks were, of course, precisely those for which Marc Bloch argued many decades ago that comparative analysis was indispensable. 26 And though Americanists have applied comparative techniques to case examples far more separated in time and space, and thus more disparate in cultural and historical origins and trajectories than Block deemed prudent, 27 their work has proved as potent an antidote to assumptions of national exceptionalism as his Seminal studies on medieval Europe.
In conceiving United States history comparatively and thus integrating it meaningfully into a larger global context, it has been essential to distinguish between exceptionalism and difference.
Exceptionalist I think it fair to argue that the findings of most comparativists who make extensive use of case evidence drawn from United States history underscore the ftnportance of difference as opposed to the exceptional nature of the American experience. 28 Though exceptionalist claims have only rarely been based on well-grounded comparisons, 29 that is, of course, the only way they can be empirically verified or disproved. But, as most of the cross-cultural analyses of key patterns in American history written in recent decades amply demonstrate, serious comparison is better suited to determining the extent to which and why developments in the United States paralleled or diverged from those other societies. The fact that much of the comparative work done thus far has stressed difference rather than similarity has been troubling for a number of prominent advocates of internationalist history, such as Ian Tyrrell and Akira Iriye. They have urged that we can best counter American exceptionalism by deploying international and transregional (i.e. encompassing the Atlantic basin or the Pacific rim) approaches that play down national differences and foreground cross-cultural similarities, which Iriye suggests are ultimately products of the unity of the human condition. 30 But both recurring and divergent historical patterns are proper subjects for comparative and international history. And both similarities and differences challenge American exceptionalism by placing United States history in broader global frames of reference that allow us to identify and explore underlying commonalities in major patterns of societal development across time and space.
All societies exhibit variations on these shared themes; and each has experienced trans-cultural processes of historical transformation, such as agrarian expansion, industrialization or conquest, in distinctive ways.
Akira Iriye's realization as a student in postwar Japan that his national history "could best be understood when it was examined from without as well as from within," 31 world history. They demonstrate that national units, taken as a whole or conceived as autonomous entities, are difficult, if not impossible, to compare meaningfully. Comparative and world history perspectives expose concepts of national purpose and character as the same sort of essentialisms associated with now discredited approaches to history that were grounded in racial, religious or civilizational typologies. And they illustrate the ways in which national frames of reference can obscure or skew our understandings of cross-cultural interactions or trans-national phenomena.
Rather than whole civilizations (a term that is problematic in and of itself) or unified national narratives, serious comparison and manageable world history compel us to focus on clearly delineated processes and particular types of institutions, social movements or discourses Somewhat paradoxically, this narrowing of the breadth of occurrences and issues to be studied requires comparativists and globalists to concentrate on the history of specific sub-regions, or even locales, that are then compared in depth to areas in other societies that evince the same type of transformations, institutional development or socio-intellectual upheavals. This approach to historical analysis inevitably forces us beyond elite-and malecentric narratives that until recent decades have dominated the historiography of both the United States and the areas to which it has been compared. 32 In this way comparative and international perspectives have prompted or reinforced broader efforts by historians and other social scientists to give agency and voice to a diverse range of ethnic, gender, and class groups that had long neglected, or altogether ignored. Meaningfully integrating American history into global narratives and comparative analyses also countered the tendency for the writings and courses of areas specialists and world historians to be ghettoized, confined in their appeal to relatively small numbers of readers and students. But above all, the traumatic descent in the 1960s into the Vietnam quagmire underscored the deficiencies and literal dangers of conceiving the world history of the early modern and modern eras without a meaningful United States component. It also led to the realization that without serious inquiry into the history of the societies in the areas into which the Americans increasingly intruded and the larger global systems in which they came to play dominant roles, we cannot begin to understand the political, military, economic and cultural impact on the rest of the world of America's emergence in the twentieth century to global hegemon.
